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EIGHTH AMENDMENT-A SIGNIFICANT
LIMIT ON FEDERAL COURT
ACTIVISM IN AMELIORATING
STATE PRISON CONDITIONS
Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
Last term in Rhodes v. Chapman,I the Supreme Court held that hous-
ing two inmates in a cell designed for one at the modern Southern Ohio
Correctional Facility (SOCF) did not violate the eighth amendment.
2
This decision significantly limits federal court involvement in ameliorat-
ing conditions at state prisons. Nothing in the opinion suggests that the
Court is willing to countenance truly "deplorable" or "sordid" condi-
tions at state prisons.3 However, Rhodes precludes federal court inter-
vention where prison conditions have fallen below minimum
professional standards and only threaten to become truly intolerable.
Federal courts are not to anticipate the long-term detrimental conse-
quences of prison conditions or evaluate the penological justification, if
any, for these conditions. Rather, in evaluating prison conditions and in
formulating remedies, only actual serious harm to inmates is judicially
relevant.
4
This limited conception of the role of the judiciary in evaluating
state prison conditions stems from Rhodes' restrictive interpretation of
the eighth amendment.5 In contrast to the approach taken by many
lower courts, 6 the Supreme Court failed to mount an independent in-
quiry as to whether the conditions at SOCF violate "evolving standards
of decency," 7 and confined its analysis to whether these conditions in-
volve the "wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain" or are "grossly
1 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981).
2 U.S. CONST. amend VIII states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
3 101 S. Ct. at 2401.
4 In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan conceded that the district court may have
been correct "in the abstract" that double ceiling was harmful, but he argued that courts may
only examine the "actual effect" of the challenged conditions. 101 S. Ct. at 2409.
5 See notes 120-24 & accompanying text in.fra.
6 See notes 194-96 & accompanying text infra.
7 The phrase is from Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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disproportionate to the severity of the crime[s] warranting imprison-
ment." 8 In its deference to state penal practices, Rhodes also reiterated
the Court's strong admonition in Bell v. Wofish9 that federal courts
should not take an active role in effectuating improvements in state pris-
ons. Thus, with Rhodes, the Court effectively undermined federal court
leadership in pressing for improvements in state prisons across the
country.
II. BACKGROUND: OVERCROWDING AND EXTENSIVE JUDICIAL
INVOLVEMENT IN PRISON MATTERS
The Court heard the Rhodes case "because of the importance of the
question to prison administration." 10 At stake was nothing less than
control over the administration of state prisons. Because conditions at
SOCF had not yet significantly deteriorated due to overcrowding, a de-
cision in favor of the inmates would have effectively established a consti-
tutional minimum space requirement of approximately sixty square feet
per inmate. Implementing this standard would have required state ex-
penditures of up to ten billion dollars for prison construction. II Alterna-
tively, states could have ameliorated prison overcrowding by redefining
criminal activity or by altering their sentencing, parole and penal prac-
tices.12 Since the federal courts would likely be forced to oversee the
implementation of the per inmate space standard, a decision in favor of
the inmates would have led to increased federal court reliance on the
sweeping and detailed "institutional remedies" which have character-
ized prison condition litigation.13 In short, in Rhodes the Court was sim-
ply unwilling to risk a near certain multi-billion dollar confrontation
with state legislatures, and reluctant to set a strong precedent for active
federal court scrutiny of general conditions in other institutions.
Federal courts traditionally maintained a "hands off" approach to-
8 101 S. Ct. at 2399.
9 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979).
10 101 S. Ct. at 2397.
11 See note 138 & accompanying text infra.
12 See note 139 & accompanying text infra.
13 See general' D. HORowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Chayes, The Role
of the Judge in Public Law Litgation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Cox, The New Dimensions of
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 51 WASH. L. REV. 791 (1976); Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinav, and
the Extraordnap, in InstitutionalLitigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980); Frug, TheJudicial Power
of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1978); Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 949 (1978); Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies,
30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978); Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confiement: An
Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the Eighth
Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REV. 893 (1977); Symposium,Judicia lly Managed Institutional Reform, 32
ALA. L. REV. 267-464 (1980); Note, Complex Enforcement- Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94
HARv. L. REV. 626 (1981).
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wards state prisons.1 4 However, following Holt v. Sarver,15 the landmark
decision which found the Arkansas prison system unconstitutional, fed-
eral courts have played an extremely active role in ameliorating condi-
tions at state and local prisons. Since Holt, federal courts have found
conditions in individual state prisons or entire state prison systems of at
least twenty-two states to be unconstitutional. 16 As of March 31, 1978,
over 8,000 cases filed by prison inmates alleging unconstitutional prison
conditions or practices were pending.'
7
Prison populations have risen rapidly in recent years, growing
forty-two percent between 1975 and 1980.18 State prison population
grew at an average annual rate of 7.4 percent during the 1973-1978 pe-
riod.' 9 Further increases are likely during the next several years, al-
though it is difficult to make accurate forecasts. 20 Even though capital
outlays for state prison systems increased by almost fifty percent during
14 The term "hands off doctrine" originated in FRrrcH, CIVIL RIGHTS OF INMATES 31
(1961). For a survey and criticism of the doctrine, see Comment, Bfyondthe Ken of the Courts: A
Critique ofjudieial Refual to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE LJ. 506 (1963). The
Supreme Court noted the demise of the hands off doctrine in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 555-56 (1974). ("There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the pris-
ons of this country').
15 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark, 1970), aJ'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (Holt II).
For earlier litigation involving conditions at the same institutions, see Courtney v.
Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1969), cer. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969); Jackson v. Bishop, 404
F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968), vacating, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F.
Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (Holt 1); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
For later litigation, see Finney v. Mabry, 455 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Ark. 1978); 458 F. Supp. 720
(E.D. Ark. 1978) (consent decree); Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark. 1976), afd,
548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977), afd, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D.
Ark. 1973), afdinpart, rev'dinpartsub nom., Finney v. Arkansas Board of Corrections, 505 F.2d
194 (8th Cir. 1974) (Holt III).
For an analysis of the effectiveness ofjudicial intervention in the Arkansas prison system,
see, M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES
IN CORRECTIONAL SErrINGS (1977).
16 For a thorough survey of these cases, see 101 S. Ct. at 2402 n.2 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
17 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 3 AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS 33 (1980) [herein-
after cited as AMERICAN PRISONS]. Prison civil rights cases comprise about five percent of the
civil filings in federal courts. &e, Cidl Rights oflnstitutionaled Persons, Hearnngs on S 1393 before
the Subcomrn. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciag, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 427
(1977).
18 Krajick, The Boom Resumes, 7 CORRECTIONS 16, 16-17 (1981).
19 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 17, at 14.
20 2 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 17, at 4-5. The sources of uncertainty in forecasting
prison population include inadequate data, random fluctuations in prison populations, and
changes in criminal justice policy which affect the flow of people to and from penal
institutions.
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the 1971-1977 period, 21 population gains in many state prisons outpaced
the construction of new facilities. The Texas prison population, for ex-
ample, nearly doubled between 1968 and 1978 while its prison capacity
increased by only thirty percent. 22 All of the advisory bodies setting
prison space standards have concluded that each inmate needs at least
sixty square feet of space, preferably in a single cell, in order to prevent
mental and physical deterioration. 23 As of April 1, 1978, sixty-five per-
21 3 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 17, at 130. This represents slightly less than a thirty
percent increase in real terms.
More than 150 state prisons have been built in the last ten years. A total of 62 prisons in
41 states are currently under construction. See NEWSWEEK, March 23, 1981, at 54.
22 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECT OF OVERCROWDING ON INMATE BE-
HAVIOR 103 (1980) [hereinafter cited as EFFECT OF OVERCROWDING]. See also Ruiz v. Es-
telle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1277, 1280-81 (S.D. Tex. 1980), stayed pending appeal, 650 F.2d 555
(5th Cir. 1981).
23
Per Inmate S ace Stan-Organization dr
(in square feet)
The International Conference of Building
Officials 90
National Advisory Commission for Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals 80
American Correctional Association 80 (10 hrs. or more
(Manual of Standards for Adult Institutions) in cell daily)
60 (Less than 10
h4ovrs daily)
Department of Justice, Federal Correctional 80 (10 hrs. or more)
Policy Task Force 60 (Less than 10 hrs.)
American Correctional Association
(Manual of Correctional Standards) 75
American Public Health Association 75 (dormitory)
60 (single cell)
American Institute of Architects 70
Building Officials and Code Administrators,
Inc. 70
Building Officials Conference Code of
America 70
National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice
Planning and Architecture 70
National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Law 70
National Sheriff's Association 70
Many courts have relied on these standards when ordering improvements in prison condi-
tions. See note 35 infra.
For a graphic description of the limited space in a typical cell see 1 AMERICAN PRISONS,
supra note 17, at 59:
In the quite typical 6 by 8 foot or 6 by 9 foot (48 to 54 square feet) cell, actual floor space
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cent of all state prison inmates were provided with less than this amount
of space.24 Using the same standard, state prisons were operating at 173
percent of capacity.
25
A recent study documenting the harmful effects of overcrowding on
inmates concluded that "[w]hen [prison] facilities are relatively fixed,
increases in population lead to disproportionately higher negative ef-
fects."126 The study found that the rates of death, suicide and discipli-
nary infractions rose substantially faster than population increases in the
Texas prison system.27 Conversely, when the population of the
Oklahoma system dropped, there was an even greater decline in the vio-
lent death rate.28 "Double ceiling," the housing of two inmates in a cell
designed for one, is a common response to prison population increases.
2 9
The study found that double celling has "measurably greater negative
effects than single unit housing."30 It also revealed that large penal in-
stitutions, including those the size of SOCF, produce more negative ef-
fects than smaller prisons.
31
must accommodate the usual wall-hung bed and some sort of open toilet and wash sink
in combination or separately mounted. The bed reduces floor space by about 18 square
feet, and the toilet facilities by an additional four square feet. Frequently one finds a
chair, table, and shelves which reduce the square footage again by up to another ten
square feet. This leaves 16-22 square feet of net movement space-including space be-
tween the table and toilet, table and bed, or cell door and bed, all of which are normally
inaccessible, and, therefore, constructively unusuable.
A prisoner who is 5 feet 5 inches tall, standing in the center of his cell (facing the
entrance) can extend his arms, and with no effort, touch both walls over the bed and
desk. A prisoner who is 6 feet tall or more will have to bend his arms at the elbows to
accomplish the same task. It takes little imagination to understanding the devastating
effect of double ceiling.
24 Id at 61. In 1978, 19 percent of state cells and 11 percent of federal cells were occupied
by two or more inmates. Three or more inmates were housed in over 3,000 "single" cells,
primarily in state prisons. Id at 59.
25 3 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 17, at 57. Using the capacity of individual confine-
ment cells as reported by the states, the utilization rate was 94 percent. When capacity is
defined as one inmate per cell of any size or, for dormitories, the smaller of 60 square feet per
inmate of the capacity as rated by the state, the utilization figure is 114 percent.
26 EFFECT OF OVERCROWDING,.uzEra note 22, at 129. See also Megarger, Population Density
and Disruptive Behavior in a Prison Setting, in PRISON VIOLENCE 135 (A. Cohen, G. Cole, & R.
Bailey eds. 1976).
27 EFFECT OF OVERCROWDING, supra note 26, at 103-17.
28 Id at 104-05.
29 Id at 125. Housing four and five prisoners in a cell designed for one is not an unknown
phenomenon. Se, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1278 (S.D. Tex. 1980), order stayed
pending appeal, 650 F.2d 555'(5th Cir. 1981); Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 40
(M.D. Fla. 1975) (Appendix A, photo).
30 EFFECT OF OVERCROWDING, supra note 22, at 125. Differences were observed in illness
complaint rates, tolerance of overcrowding, nonviolent disciplinary infractions, mood states,
rating of the institutional environment and perceptions of personal choice and control. Id
31 Id at 129. The study compared institutions with approximately 1,500 inmates with
those holding about 1,000 inmates. The large'institutions had higher death rates (both vio-
lent and non-violent) and disproportionately more suicides, psychiatric commitments, self-
mutilations and attempted suicides. SOCF has a design capacity of about 1,660, and, at the
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Overcrowding has been a major issue in most cases challenging
general prison conditions.32 By increasing pressure on physical facilities
and staff, overcrowding is often the source of a variety of prison
problems, including breakdowns in sanitation, security, medical care
and rehabilitative services. 33 In their remedial orders, lower federal
courts have curbed overcrowding by forbidding double celling in cells
ranging from thirty-five to eighty-eight square feet in size.34 In reaching
their decisions, they have relied extensively upon the per inmate space
minimums established by the assorted prison advisory groups.3 5
time of trial, held 2,313 inmates. Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1010-11 (S.D. Ohio
1977).
32 See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. dMied, 101 S. Ct. 1759
(1981); Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265.
33 See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, afdas moded, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977),
reo'don other grounds, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam). "Each of these failings in Alabama's
penal system is compounded by that system's most pervasive and most obvious problem; the
overcrowding with which all prisoners must live." 406 F. Supp. at 325.
34 Size of Cell Court Order
35-40 sq.ft. Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395.
40 sq. ft Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648 (D. Md. 1978), aj'd in part,
40 sq. ft. 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978).
44 sq. ft. Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727 (D.Md.), afd in part, 588 F.2d
1378 (4th Cir. 1978).
45 sq. ft. Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265.
47 sq. ft. Burks v. Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1979).
48 sq. ft. Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
49 sq. ft. Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), af'd,
525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.), vacated on rehearing on other grounds, 539
F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), reod, 430 U.S. 325, affdon re-
mand, 553 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (per curiam).
60 sq. ft. (isola- Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318.
tion and segrega-
tion cells)
60 sq. ft. Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Del. 1977).
64 sq. ft. Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802 (D. Ore. 1980), order stayed pend-
ing appeal, 651 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1981).
65 sq. ft. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980).
75 sq. ft. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 520
(1979).
88 sq. ft. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 494 F.2d 1196 (2d
Cir. 1974)
35 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1385-86; Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802,
809-10 (D. Ore. 1980); Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 154 (D. Col. 1979). For one court's
extensive reliance on professional standards in ordering other prison improvements, see
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 990-994 (D.R.I. 1977). See also Lareau v. Manson,
507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980), for a discussion of the enforceability of prison
standards as conventions of international law.
Other remedies ordered by lower courts in order to curb overcrowding have included:
accelerating parole dates, see Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978); limiting the
1350 [Vol. 72
1981] STA TE PRISON CONDITIONS 1351
The remedies ordered by federal courts in prison condition cases
usually are not limited to a specific problem like overcrowding. Charac-
teristically, they attack the deficiencies of a prison system by mandating
major changes in prison operation in a wide variety of areas.36 These
institutional remedies usually require the courts to maintain close super-
vision over state prisons, often for many years.3 ' Moreover, they are
often extremely expensive. In order to bring the Louisiana prison sys-
tem into compliance with a federal court order38 the state legislature
had to make a supplemental appropriation of $18,431,622 for a single
year's operating expenditures and of $105,605,000 for capital outlays.
39
When state legislatures have been reluctant to appropriate additional
money for prisons, the federal courts have in effect ordered additional
expenditures.40
III. LOWER COURTS FOUND SOCF DOUBLE CELLING
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Southern Ohio Correctional Facility was built in the early
1970s and is Ohio's only maximum security prison.41 Described by the
district court as "unquestionably a top-flight, first class facility," SOCF
prison population to design capacity and prohibiting the acceptance of new prisoners until
this level is reached, see Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977); increasing reli-
ance on work release and inmate furlough programs and expanding community based correc-
tional programs, see Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265; reclassifying prisoners to reduce the
population at maximum security facilities, see Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956
(D.R.I. 1977).
36 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. at 1387:
The relief ... will require many changes in TDC's operations. TDC will be obliged,
inter alia, to reduce the inmate population at each unit, to increase the security and
support staff, to furnish adequate medical and mental health care, and to bring all living
and working environments into compliance with state health and safety standards. Its
officials will be charged with the duty of instituting, performing and supervising prac-
tices that will extirpate and abate staff brutality, the use of building tenders, abuse of the
disciplinary process, and further violation of the inmates' rights to access to the courts.
Achievement of all these tasks- will be extremely difficult even under the best of circum-
stances, and it may be anticipated that elimination of some of the long-standing practices
will be particularly troublesome. The record clearly manifests that the necessary
changes cannot be effectuated under TDC's existing organizational structure.
37 See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385, and related cases, note 15 sufira.
38 Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206.
39 Id at 1219-21. See a/so Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 400. (Circuit court upheld
extensive prison remedy e~en though the legislative allocation for the state prison system had
increased 534 percent between 1973 and 1976).
40 See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330:
[A] state is not at liberty to afford its citizens only those constitutional rights which fit
comfortably within its budget. The Alabama legislature has had ample opportunity to
make provision for the state to meet its constitutional responsibilities in this area, and it
has failed to do so. It is established beyond doubt that inadequate funding is no answer
to the existence of unconstitutional conditions in state penal institutions.
41 Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1009.
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has a superior law library as well as school facilities, workshops, a forty
bed hospital and outdoor recreational and visitation areas.42 Its cells are
approximately sixty-three square feet in size. 43 In addition to a bed (or
bunk beds if double celled) occupying twenty square feet, each cell con-
tains a cabinet type night stand, wall cabinet, shelf, wall mounted lava-
tory with hot and cold running water, commode flushed from inside the
cell, and a radio and ventilation duct.44 Each cell block contains a
dayroom "designed to furnish that type of recreation or occupation
which an ordinary citizen would seek in his living room or den. ' 45
At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300 inmates, thirty-eight per-
cent over its design capacity.46 Sixty-seven percent of the inmates were
serving either life or first degree felony sentences.47 Approximately
1,400 inmates were doubled celled. 48 About seventy-five percent of the
double celled inmates were permitted to leave their cells for about
fifteen hours daily and go to the dayroom or participate in prison
activities.
49
The district court found that double ceiling had not overtaxed
SOCF's physical facilities or staff. Its food, ventilation and noise levels
were acceptable and double celling had not significantly reduced inmate
access to the dayrooms, visitation facilities, law library or school pro-
grams.50 Nor were plaintiffs able to establish that there had been an
increase in inmate violence and criminal activity which could be attrib-
uted to double celling.
51
The district court did find that prison jobs had been "watered
down" by assigning more inmates than were necessary to each job.52
While there was evidence of inappropriate medical treatment and iso-
42 Id at 1009-11.
43 Id at 1011.
44
Id
45 Id at 1012.
46 Id at 1010-11.
47 Id at 1011.
4 8 Id
49 Id at 1012-13. Four other inmate classes made up the remaining 25 percent of the
double celled inmates. Those who requested protective custody but who could not substanti-
ate their fears were locked in their cells for all but six hours weekly. New inmates and those
classified as voluntarily idle were in their cells for all but four hours a week. Inmates in
isolation cells left their cells two hours weekly. Id
50 Id at 1012-15.
51 Id at 1018. An increase in violence is probably the most graphic indication that over-
crowding harms inmates. Thus, the plaintiffs' failure to establish that overcrowding had
caused greater violence was a major weakness in their case. The high levels of violence associ-
ated with prison overcrowding have been key factor in establishing cruel and unusual punish-
ment in other prison conditions cases. See, e.g., Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1211;
Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1303.
52 Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. at 1015.
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lated instances of failure to provide medical attention, the situation was
not "out-of-hand or the result of indifference. ' 53 As a result of over-
crowding, however, SOCF inmates were substantially deprived of psy-
chological services.
54
Despite these generally favorable findings, the district court held
that the "totality of circumstances" at SOCF made double celling un-
constitutional. 55 It identified five important factors. First, the inmates'
long sentences exacerbated the problems of close confinement and over-
crowding.56 Second, SOCF held thirty-eight percent more inmates than
its rated capacity and such "overcrowding necessarily involves excess
limitation of general movement as well as physical and mental injury
from long exposure."' 57 Third, the cells were built to house one person
and in light of recommended prison space guidelines, the space alloted
to each double celled inmate was insufficient 58 Fourth, double celled
inmates spent most o their time in their cells and a significant number
of these inmates were locked in their cells with their cellmates for over
twenty-three hours daily.59 Fifth, double ceiling was not a temporary
expedient, which would have been "undoubtedly permissible," but in-
stead seemed destined to become a regular practice.
60
In an unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court's decision.61 It disagreed with the petitioner's
argument that the lower court's decision had made double celling un-
constitutional per se. The Sixth Circuit ruled that the district court's
findings were not clearly erroneous, its conclusions of law were permissi-
ble, and its remedy reasonable. 62 The Supreme Court's understanding
of the district court's decision as making double ceiling unconstitutional
per se probably prompted it to grant certiorari.
63
53 Id at 1015-16.
54 Id at 1016. The Supreme Court minimized the significance of this finding. Rhodes v.
Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2397.
55 Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. at 1020-21.
56 Id at 1020.
57 Id
58 Id at 1021.
59 Id The members of the Supreme Court disagreed in their interpretation of this find-
ing. Compare 101 S. Ct. at 2400 n.15 (majority opinion) with 101 S. Ct. at 2412 n.6 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
60 Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. at 1021.
61 624 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980).
62 Id
63 101 S. Ct. at 2409 n.13 (Brennan, J., concurring); "The five considerations cited by the
District Court . . . are not separate aspects of conditions at the prison; rather, they merely
embroider upon the theme that double celling is unconstitutional in itself."
1981] 1353
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT REVERSES
In a decision written by Justice Powell, the Supreme Court reversed
the lower courts' holdings.64 While the Court never explicitly adopted
an eighth amendment test, it limited its inquiry to whether conditions at
SOCF wantonly and unnecessarily inflict pain or are grossly dispropor-
tionate to the severity of the crimes warranting imprisonment. 65 Prison
conditions which are neither excessive nor disproportionate under con-
temporary standards are not unconstitutional and "to the extent that
such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the pen-
alty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society."
'66
Applying this eighth amendment interpretation to the conditions at
SOCF, the Court stressed that double celling had not deprived inmates
of food, medical care or adequate sanitation, nor led to a disproportion-
ate increase in prison violence.67 A marginal diminution in work and
educational programs was, according to the Court, far from a depriva-
tion of constitutional dimension. 68 The Court also dismissed the five
considerations relied upon by the district court in finding double celling
unconstitutional as "fall[ing] far short in themselves of proving cruel
and unusual punishment. ' 69 The Court concluded its eighth amend-
ment analysis by stating that "the Constitution does not mandate com-
fortable prisons" and that the problems of double celling at SOCF
should be "weighed by the legislature and prison administration rather
than a court.' ' 70 In the final portion of the opinion, the Court discour-
aged judicial activism in the area of prison conditions by warning that
"courts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are in-
sensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal func-
tion in the criminal justice system .... ,,71
In a concurring opinion joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
Justice Brennan emphasized that "today's decision should in no way be
construed as a retreat from careful judicial scrutiny of prison condi-
tions."' 72 Justice Brennan began by discussing the factors which have
led to the emergence of the federal courts as the "critical force" behind
the amelioration of inhumane prison conditions. Among these factors
64 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981).





70 Id at 2400.
71 Id at 2401-02.
72 Id at 2402 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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are the lag in correctional expenditures behind rising prison popula-
tions, public apathy, the political powerlessness of prisoners, and the re-
fusal of state legislatures to allocate sufficient money to raise prison
conditions to minimally adequate levels.
73
Justice Brennan's eighth amendment analysis differed from the ma-
jority's. He believed that the Court should question whether prison con-
ditions comport with "human dignity."' 74 Noting that poor prison
conditions often arise from neglect rather than policy, Justice Brennan
argued that "there is no reason of comity, judicial restraint, or recogni-
tion of expertise for courts to defer to negligent omissions of officials who
lack the resources or motivation to operate prisons within limits of de-
cency."' 75 Outlining and then applying a totality of the circumstances
test,76 Justice Brennan described SOCF as "one of the better, more hu-
mane large prisons. ' 77 Rejecting a view that double celling is per se
unconstitutional, Justice Brennan concluded that absent any "actual
signs" that double celling has seriously harmed SOCF inmates the prac-
tice is not unconstitutional. 78 Justice Blackmun, who joined in Justice
Brennan's concurrence and wrote a separate concurring opinion, said
that the majority opinion should not be read as marking a retreat from
federal court scrutiny of state prison conditions.79
Justice Marshall, the only dissenter, argued that double celling did
not result from a considered legislative policy judgment, but simply be-
cause more individuals were sent to SOCF than it was designed to
hold.80 According to Justice Marshall, the relevant legislative. policy
judgment was the initial decision during the design of the facility to
provide each inmate with his own cell. 8 ' Pointing to unanimous and
undisputed expert testimony that double celling is undesirable,82 and to
the district court's finding that long-term double celling necessarily
causes mental and physical deterioration, 83 Justice Marshall concluded
that the conditions at SOCF violate eighth amendment norms.8 4 In the
final portion of his dissent, Justice Marshall expressed his fear that the
majority opinion will "eviscerate" the federal courts' role in actively re-
73 Id at 2404-05.
74 id at 2406.
75 Id at 2407.
76 Id at 2407-08.
77 Id at 2408-09.
78 Id at 2409-10.
79 d at 2410.
80 Id at 2411.
81 Id
82 Id at n.1 (quoting 434 F. Supp. at 1016).




viewing state prison conditions.8 5 Warning that the majority has taken
"far too sanguine a view of the motivations of state legislators and prison
officials," Justice Marshall argued that a strong federal court presence is
especially needed because "[i]n the current climate it is unrealistic to
expect legislators to care whether the prisons are overcrowded or harm-
ful to inmate health."
8 6
V. EIGHTH AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION
A. RHODES UTILIZES A NARROW EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Rhodes marks the first time that the Court has considered the re-
strictions which the eighth amendment places upon conditions at state
prisons.8 7 The Court's narrow interpretation of the amendment in the
decision exemplifies its restrictive reading of the "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause in recent cases. It precludes an assertive role by the
judiciary in defining and protecting standards of human decency and
dignity in the context of confinement.
Three general applications of the eighth amendment can be identi-
fied. Originally, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
applied to only unusually barbarous or tortuous sanctions. For exam-
ple, in a pair of cases late in the nineteenth century, the Court upheld
executions by shooting8 8 and electrocution.8 9 It distinguished these
forms of capital punishment from intentionally cruel punishments such
as burning at the stake, crucifixion or breaking at the wheel.9 0 Over a
half century later, Justice Frankfurter contributed influential language
to this mode of eighth amendment analysis when he attacked govern-
85 Id
86 Id at 2414. It is unclear what Justice Marshall means by the "current climate" in
which legislators will condone inhumane prison conditions. Perhaps he is referring to the
growing support for the punitive theory of criminal justice. See general/4 J. WILSON, THINK-
ING ABOUT CRIME (1975).
Rhodes was decided during a period of conservative dominance in the executive and legis-
lative branches of the federal government. The conservatism was illustrated by the massive
transfer of federal funds from social welfare programs to the military and a tax cut benefiting
primarily taxpayers in upper-income brackets which were engineered by the Reagan adminis-
tration in the spring and summer of 1981. The conservative fervor and hi-partisan support
for the cuts in social programs must have been an important signal to the Court to avoid
forcing billions in governmental expenditures or innovative penal reforms in order to reduce
prison overcrowding. See notes 138-43 & accompanying text infia.
87 101 S. Ct. at 2397-98.
88 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
89 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). In a subsequent eighth amendment challenge, the
Court upheld the second execution of an individual after the first attempt had failed due to a
faulty electric chair. State of Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947),
rehearing denied, 330 U.S. 853 (1947).
90 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446.
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ment conduct which "shocked the conscience." 91
In Weems v. United States92 the Court developed a second application
of the eighth amendment when it forebade punishments which are
grossly disproportionate to the criminal offense. 93 It stayed the imposi-
tion of the cadena temporal, a sentence of twelve years at hard and painful
labor with permanent loss of civil rights, upon an individual who had
falsified public records.94 Weems was also the precursor of a third appli-
cation of the eighth amendment. Explaining its expansion of the eighth
amendment to cover disproportionate punishment, the Court noted that
"time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes;
[t]herefore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application
than the mischief which gave it birth. ' 95 The eighth amendment "is not
fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion be-
comes enlightened by a humane justice. '96
The notion that the eighth amendment incorporates advancing
standards of a "humane justice" was elevated into a distinct mode of
eighth amendment analysis fifty years later in Trop v. Dulles.97 Forbid-
ding the denaturalization of an individual who had briefly deserted the
army, the Court stated that "the basic concept underlying the eighth
amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man, [w]hile the State has
the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be
exercised within the limits of civilized standards." 98 The Court went on
to observe that the scope of the eighth amendment is not static and
"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." 99
The central problem for eighth amendment analysis since Trop has
been whether "evolving standards of decency" and the "dignity of man"
constitute a distinct constitutional "test" or whether this language sim-
ply means that the definitions of cruelty and disproportionality may
change over time. Those justices who discern a separate "decency" stan-
dard in the eighth amendment favor the judiciary's taking a leading role
in defining and advancing such "public values." 1°° On the other hand,
91 Rochin v. California, 344 U.S. 465, 472 (1952). Rochin was a due process case. For use
of the "shock the conscience" test in prison condition cases, see Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp.
362 at 372-73; Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1977); Crowe v. Leeke, 540
F.2d 740, 742 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (triple celling does not "shock the conscience").
92 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
93 Id at 367.
94 Id at 365-67.
95 Id at 373.
96 Id at 378.
97 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
98 Id at 100.
99 Id at 101.
100 For an argument that the courts should take an active role in giving specific meaning
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those justices who would largely confine the eighth amendment to its
two traditional applications envision a much more limited role for the
courts in mandating changes in state practices in the interest of "subjec-
tive" notions of human dignity and decency.
This ideological split is especially evident in Furman v. Georgia,1° 1
where the Court struck down a state death penalty statute. None of the
justices disputed the two traditional applications of the eighth amend-
ment. The source of their disagreement was the extent to which the
Court should use the amendment to make an independent and critical
analysis of the morality and efficacy of state punitive practices. Justice
Brennan viewed the eighth amendment as prohibiting "uncivilized and
inhumane punishments."' 10 2 A state "must treat its members with re-
spect for their intrinsic worth as human beings" and its punishments
"must comport with human dignity."'10 3 Advocating active judicial re-
view of state imposed punishments, Justice Brennan defined a punish-
ment to be in violation of the eighth amendment when "there is a
significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for
which the punishment is inflicted." 104 Maintaining that standards of
decency had advanced, Justices Brennan105 and Marshall 0 6 found the
death penalty unconstitutional per se.
At the other end of the ideological spectrum, Justice Powell found
in the eighth amendment "no support . . . for the view that the court
may invalidate a category of penalties because we deem less severe ones
adequate to serve the ends of penology."' 0 7 In his dissenting opinion,
Chief Justice Burger explicitly rejected judicial use of standards of de-
cency as a distinct eighth amendment test by stating that "in a democ-
and operational content to ambiguous constitutional values such as liberty, equality, due
process and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment and in setting priorities when such
values conflict, see Fiss, Forward- The Fons ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979). Fiss does not
advocate, however, that the judiciary become the final arbiter of public values: "Judges have
no monopoly on the task of giving meaning to the public values of the Constitution, but
neither is there reason for them to be silent. They too can make a contribution to public
debate and inquiry." Id at 2. In his article, Fiss outlines how structural reform of state
institutions by the courts has been a primary forum for judicial enunciation of public values.
1I 408 U.S. 238.
102 Id at 270.
103 Id
104 Id at 279. See also Justice Marshall's concurring opinion. ("A penalty may be cruel
and unusual if it is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose." Id at 331).
105 Id at 305.
106 Id at 370-71.
107 Id at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion:
"The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit all punishment the States are unable to prove
necessary to deter or control crime. The Amendment is not concerned with the process by




racy the legislative judgment is presumed to embody the basic standards
of decency prevailing in society."108 Thus, he argued that the death
penalty statute was constitutionally acceptable, even though expressing
grave doubts as to its efficacy and morality. 10 9
Since Furman, the more limited interpretation of the eighth amend-
ment has prevailed and "standards of decency" no longer constitute an
independently viable eighth amendment norm. In Gregg v. Georgia,110
another death penalty challenge, the Court rejected close judicial evalu-
ation of the efficacy or decency of legislatively imposed punishments.
Limiting the eighth amendment to its two traditional applications, the
Court stated that the judiciary was "not to require the legislature to
select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is
not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved." 11
In Ingraham v. Wnght' 12 the Court declined to extend the eighth
amendment to cover school disciplinary practices, limiting the scope of
its protection to convicted criminals.'" 3 Importantly, the Court rejected
the petitioner's argument that the eighth amendment should be ex-
panded because standards of decency had advanced"14 and social insti-
tutions had changed significantly since its adoption.115 In dictum, the
Court narrowly limited the applicability of the eighth amendment to
prisoners, remarking that "the protection afforded [prisoners] by the
Eighth Amendment is limited. After incarceration only the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment."' 1
6
The Court's reluctance to utilize a separate decency standard is fur-
ther illustrated by Rummel v. Estelle117 where the Court upheld the impo-
sition of an automatic life sentence under a state recividist statute on an
individual whose three thefts did not involve violence and netted less
than $230. The Court rejected Rummel's argument that due to the pet-
108 Id at 384. The Chief Justice also observed that: "[U]p to now the Court has never
actually held that a punishment has become impermissibly cruel due to a shift in the weight
of accepted social values; nor has the Court suggested judicially manageable criteria for mea-
suring such a shift in moral concerns." Id at 382-83.
109 Id at 375.
110 428 U.S. 153 (1979).
"'l Id at 175..
112 430 U.S. 651 (1979).
113 Id at 666-68.
114 Id at 668 n.36.
115 Id at 668. This position illustrates the Court's strong reluctance to use the eighth
amendment to outline and protect public values of decency and human dignity.
116 Id at 669-70. This language was employed by the Court in Rhodes, where it stated that
"Conditions must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be
grossly disproportionate. . ." 101 S. Ct. at 2399.
117 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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tiness of the crimes, the sentence was disproportionate, stating that such
an analysis would embroil the Court in "subjective" decision-making
which was better left to the legislature." 8 Rummd reveals the Court's
disenchantment not only with playing an active role in discerning and
shaping contemporary standards of decency but also with the very no-
tion that eighth amendment standards "evolve" rather than merely
change:
Perhaps, as asserted in Weems "time works changes" upon the Eighth
Amendment, bringing into existence 'new conditions and purposes." We
all, of course, would like to think that we are "moving down the road
toward human decency." Within the confines of this judicial proceeding,
however, we have no way of knowing in which direction that road lies. 119
In Rhodes, the Court embraced only the two traditional applications
of the eighth amendment, simply requiring that prison conditions be
neither unnecessarily cruel nor disproportionate to the inmates'
crimes. 120 Its holding that double celling at SOCF is not unconstitu-
tional easily followed from this approach. First, the Court did not ques-
tion the State's penological justification, if any, for the double celling. 121
Second, it neither considered the long-term effects of double celling on
SOCF's inmates, staff and facilities nor weighed any dignity or privacy
interests which the inmates may have. 122 Third, given SOCF's status as
a first-class facility which had not yet deteriorated due to overcrowding,
the Court concluded that inmates were not deprived of a "minimal civi-
lized measure of life's necessities."' 123 Finally, since most of the SOCF
inmates were serious offenders, even conditions that were especially "re-
strictive, even harsh" would have passed constitutional muster.
124
118 Id at 275.
119 Id at 283 (citations omitted).
120 101 S. Ct. at 2399.
121 Compare Justice Marshall's dissent, id at 2411. He points out that double ceiling did
not result from a legislative policy judgment or a decision by correctional officials. Rather,
double ceiling was instituted solely because more people were being sent to SOCF by the
courts than it was designed to hold. Among the largely independent factors which affect
prison population are prosecutorial emphasis, criminalization or decriminalization of various
behaviors, sentencing policies, parole decisions and the use of community based alternatives
to prisons. See note 155 in/ra.
122 Compare Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), where the court noted: "[W]e
find the lack of privacy inherent in double ceiling a far more compelling consideration than a
comparison of square footage or the substitution of doors for bars, carpet for concrete or
windows for walls." In Rhodes, only Justice Marshall in dissent argued that-xhe Court should
have considered the probable mental and physical harm to inmates which long-term double
celling would cause. 101 S. Ct. at 2413.
123 101 S. Ct. at 2399.
124 The precise nature of the punishment which can be inflicted upon inmates by prison
conditions had not been settled by the lower federal courts prior to Rhodes. A few courts
suggested that "persons are sent to prison as punishment, not for punishment." Battle v.
Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (quoting from an unpublished district court opinion); Laaman v.
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B. TWO WEAKNESSES IN RHODES' EIGHTH AMENDMENT APPROACH
One weakness in Rhodes' eighth amendment approach is that it in-
adequately accounts for the political dynamics which make it difficult, if
not nearly impossible for many states to operate humane prisons.
25
Prisoners are not only disenfranchised but are disproportionately from
minority groups and the poor; social groups with little political influ-
ence. 126 At best, the general public is unaware of the nature of prison
conditions. 27 More probably, prisoners are regarded with contemptu-
Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 308 (D.N.H. 1977). Most courts did not preclude use of prison
conditions as punishment but held that prison inmates could not be subjected to an environ-
ment which would cause their mental or physical degeneration or prevent their rehabilita-
tion. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566; Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 392-93;
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 339. A few lower courts declined to prohibit prison condi-
tions which may cause physical or psychological deterioration. See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama,
559 F.2d 283, 291.
In Rhodes, the Court accepted the notion that the "conditions of confinement comprise
. ..punishment." 101 S. Ct. at 2399. See also id at 2398 n.11. Its statement that prison
conditions can be "harsh" may suggest that the Court was willing to countenance a prison
environment which causes the mental and physical deterioration of inmates. As Justice
Rehnquist stated prior to the Rhodes decision "... . nothing in the Eighth Amendment...
requires that [inmates] be housed in a manner most pleasing to them, or considered even by
the most knowledgeable penal authorities to be likely to avoid confrontation, psychological
depression and the like." Capps v. Atiyeh, 101 S. Ct. 829, 831 (1981). (In Chambers opinion
by Mr. Justice Rehnquist in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit staying the
application of the injunction ordered by the District Court in Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp.
802 (D. Ore. 1980)).
125 In their separate opinions, Justices Brennan and Marshall recognize the political obsta-
cles to adequate state prisons. See, e.g., 101 S. Ct. at 2404-05 (Brennan, J., concurring); 101 S.
Ct. at 2414 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126 3 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 17, at 251-58. See generally C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL
VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 87 (1978).
Incarceration Rates per 100,000 Population, 1970
Age Black White





Source: R. CARLSON, THE DILEMMAS OF CORRECTIONS 88 (1976). As of February, 1978
only 57.3 percent of white and 55.6 percent of black jail inmates had been employed at the
time of their arrest. The median annual income for those jail inmates who had had an in-
come was $4,814 for whites and $2,986 for blacks. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 201 (1980).
127 See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 367:
Prior to about 1965 the people of Arkansas as a whole knew little or nothing about their
penal system although there were sporadic and sensational "exposes" from time to time
about alleged conditions at the [prison] farms.
These "exposes" created little, if any, lasting impression on the Arkansas public. As
of that time it is probably fair to say that many otherwise well informed Arkansas people
viewed the Penitentiary as a self-sustaining, even profit making institution, operated by a
few strong-willed men who were able to make the convicts behave themselves and work.
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ous indifference. 28 Given the high costs of constructing and operating
prisons, 29 state legislatures have been unwilling in these circumstances
to appropriate sufficient funds for adequate prisons.
t30
The special status of the inmate compels close judicial scrutiny of
prison conditions. Prisoners are completely dependent upon prison au-
thorities for conditions of their existence. The Court recognized this de-
pendency relationship in Estelle v. Gamble 13 when it noted that an
inmate must rely on prison officials for medical treatment. 32 Its analy-
sis in Ingraham v. Wright133 also illustrates the precarious status of the
prisoner. There, the Court stated that schoolchildren do not need the
protection of the eighth amendment because schools are "open" institu-
tions where the child "brings with him the support of family and friends
and is rarely apart from teachers and other people who may witness and
protest any instances of mistreatment."13 4 In contrast, prisons are
among the most "closed" institutions in society. I35 Direct community
supervision is limited both because of security considerations and the
political weakness of the prisoners' families and friends. Thus, there are
few witnesses, save for the victims themselves, to prison mistreatment.
Moreover, prisoners are by definition unable to flee from inhumane
treatment, yet effective pressure by inmates for prison improvements is
difficult136 and sometimes dangerous.
137
128 One commentator has noted:
Of crucial importance ... has been the invisibility of the [prison] institution. Prisons
are usually far away, physically and emotionally. Both as a cause and effect of this
invisibility, the community ordinarily has as little interest in the people it sends to prison
as most of us have in our garbage-we want it disposed of safely, quietly and without
much mess, but we don't particularly care how.
Bronstein, Ofender Rights Litigation: Historical and Factual Development, in 2 PRISONERS' RIGHTS
SOuRCEBooK: THEORY, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE (I. Robbins ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited
as OFFENDER RIGHTS LITIGATION].
129 3 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 17, at 115-21.
130 In one court's assessment: "When one reads between the lines of these [prison condi-
tions] opinions, it is apparent that state legislatures have been reluctant in these inflationary
times to spend sufficient tax dollars to bring conditions in outdated prisons up to minimally
acceptable standards." Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648, 654 (D. Md. 1978).
131 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
132 Id at 103.
133 439 U.S. 651 (1977).
134 Id at 651.
135 See note 128 supra.
136 Cf Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1979) (restrictions
upheld on the formation and operation of a prisoners labor union which sought to improve
working conditions, serve as a vehicle for the presentation and resolution of inmate griev-
ances, and work for changes in objectionable penal practices). See also Laaman v. Helgemoe,
437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977) (harassment of inmate who filed prison conditions suit).
137 See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 368 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (1966 inmate uprising
led to a state police investigation of the Arkansas prison system which uncovered many of its
abuses. A 1968 uprising, which was quelled with shotguns, prompted a federal grand jury
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As Justice Brennan's concurrence and Justice Marshall's dissent
suggest, the Court was not unaware of the dismal record of many states
in prison operation nor of the special dependency status of prisoners.
The overriding concern of the majority, however, was avoiding a major
confrontation with the states over the control of state prisons. With the
construction of new prisons costing up to $50,000 per inmate space, 138
implementing a sixty square foot per prisoner standard would have re-
quired up to ten billion dollars in state expenditures. While alternatives
to new prison construction exist,139 any prison reforms mandated by the
federal courts would likely be resented, if not resisted by state penal au-
thorities. I40 Since federal courts would play the major role in imple-
menting a minimum space standard, a decision for the SOCF inmates
would have substantially increased the power of the federal judiciary
vis-a-vis state legislatures and prison administrators. This would come
at a time when the "states rights" doctrine is resurgent 4 and the Con-
gress is considering major limits on the Court's jurisdiction in other con-
troversial areas like school desegregation and abortion. 142 Given these
investigation and subsequent trial of prison employees and some former employees and in-
mates. Only one person was convicted of violating the inmates' civil rights.).
See also ATTICA, THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMIS-
SION ON ATTICA (1972). (After capturing the Attica prison its inmates presented demands for
improvements in many areas of prison operation. Id at 251-57. When inmates rejected a
counter-offer from the state, the prison was stormed and thirty-two inmates were killed.) For
a listing and description of prison uprisings in the early 1970s, see CONGRESSIONAL QUAR-
TERLY, CRIME AND JUSTICE at 77-79 (1978). Many of the uprisings were sparked by poor
prison conditions. Id
138 3 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 17, at 119-26. See also The Prison Nightmare, TIME,
June 8, 1981, at 18.
139 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 17, at 119-24. Volume 4 of AMERICAN PRISONS ana-
lyzes the impact of recently amended criminal justice statutes in five states on sentencing and
release patterns as well as prison population.
See Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1128-36 (D. Del. 1977) for a survey of many
alternatives to prison construction as a means of eliminating overcrowding. See generally AL-
TERNATIVES TO PRISON: COMMUNITY BASED CORRECTIONS (G. Perlstein & T. Phelps eds.
1975); A NATION WITHOUT PRISONS (C. Dodge ed. 1975); COMMUNITY BASED CORREC-
TIONS (V. Fox ed. 1977); CORRECTIONS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (D. Peterson & C.
Thomas eds. 1975).
140 William Nagel, a former correction official and a frequent expert witness in prison
conditions cases has testified that state governments have "systematically impeded" the court
ordered prison reforms. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons: Hearings on S 1393 before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciagy, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 772 (1977).
Justice Brennan notes this testimony in his concurring opinion, 101 S. Ct. at 2405 n.7.
For a somewhat less harsh assessment of governmental responses to judicially ordered
prison improvements, see M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, supra note 15.
141 For opposing views on the merits of the "states rights" doctrine compare States'Rights and
Other Myths, TIME, February 9, 1981, at 97, with States Rightsfor Liberals, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
January 24, 1981, at 21.
142 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Index, May 30, 1981, at 947. See also The New York Times,
March 16, 1981, § 1, at 16, col. 1; Id, May 22, 1981, § 2, at 6, col. 5.
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practical considerations, the result in Rhodes is not unexpected, espe-
cially since the conditions at SOCF were relatively good.143 The price of
the majority's deference to the states, however, is likely to be poorer
prison conditions for many inmates.
Another weakness is that Rhodes' eighth amendment analysis does
not include consideration of the long-term deleterious effects of double
ceiling. The Court declined to consider the possibility that long-term
overcrowding creates a dangerous potential for frustration and violence
which could lead to a prison riot.' 44 With overcrowding recognized as a
cause of mental and physical deterioration of inmates 45 and as a major
source of prison disorders 46 one consequence of this approach may be
the unchecked rise in state prison populations to explosive levels. Given
the demonstated inability of legislatures in many states to maintain even
marginally adequate facilities,' 47 Rhodes did not transfer responsibility
for improving prison conditions from the federal courts to the states.
Rather, the decision effectively dissipated this responsibility.
One of the most interesting aspects of Rhodes is its failure to utilize
as the eighth amendment norm the prison space standards which have
been set by a variety of oversight organizations. The Court declined to
accord constitutional significance to these standards, considering them
only organizational "goals" which "cannot weigh as heavily in deter-
mining contemporary standards of decency as 'the public attitude to-
ward a given sanction.'"148 In contrast, lower courts have relied
extensively on these standards when finding and remedying over-
crowded conditions. 149 This rejection of well-established professional
standards stems from the Court foregoing, as part of its narrow interpre-
tation of the eighth amendment any independent analysis of the peno-
logical justification for state prison conditions as part of its narrow
interpretation of the eighth amendment. One fundamental problem
with this approach is the Court's tendency to rely on legislative enact-
ments or administrative practices as embodying contemporary stan-
143 See notes 42-55 & accompanying text supra. Compare these conditions with those in
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 380 (Arkansas prisons a "dark and alien world completely
alien to the free world") and Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 322-25.
144 101 S. Ct. at 2400 n.14.
145 See generaly the EFFECT OF OVERCROWDING, supra note 22.
146 See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395.
147 See notes 16 and 130 supra. See also Note, The Role of the Eighth Amendment in Prison
Reform, 38 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 647, 648-54 (1971).
148 101 S. Ct. at 2400 n.13 (quoting from Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
Courts are, however, generally unwilling or incapable of relying on social science findings.
See Dorin, Two DIFFERENT WORLDS: CRIMINOLOGISTS, JUSTICES AND RACIAL DISCRIMI-
NATION IN THE IMPOSITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN RAPE CASES, 72 J. CRIM. L. & C.
1667 (1981).
149 See note 35 supra.
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dards of cruelty, disproportionality and decency.150
Prison conditions cases, however, present a strong prima facie case
for the use of professional standards as the eighth amendment norm.
First, there is a strong concensus among experts that less than fifty or
sixty square feet of space per inmate is harmful.151 Second, since rela-
tively low numbers of middle and upper class whites are incarcerated,
the most politically and intellectually influential sectors of the public are
viscerally unaware of the nature of prison life.152 Third, if the public is
aware of prison conditions, its antipathy towards inmates may make it
an unreliable and unworthy guide when discerning constitutional
norms, even if embodied in legislative action (or inaction). Fourth, the
wide range among states of per inmate expenditures suggests that legis-
lative judgments are not accurate indicators of public notions of cruelty
and disproportionality.15 3 Fifth, even assuming that legislative policy
embodies relevant eighth amendment norms, state prison conditions
may not result from legislative policy judgments because prison admin-
istrators have a great deal of discretionary authority and can shield
prison conditions from close legislative and public scrutiny. 154 More-
over, prison overcrowding often results from factors beydnd direct legis-
lative or correctional control, such as demographics and changing
patterns of sentencing and parole.155 Finally, with prisons in all ten cir-
150 See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-76; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175-
76.
151 And in Rhodes, "The experts were all in agreement-as is everybody-that single ceiling
is desirable." 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1016. Compare this unanimity with the situation in Rum-
mel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 263-83, where the Court notes the disagreement among penologists
as to proper sentencing as an element in its decision not to stop the application of a state
recidivist statute on eighth amendment grounds.
152 See, e.g., 2 OFFENDER RIGHTS LITIGATION, supra note 128: "[F]or most whites, the
prison remains a strange and unfamiliar phenomenon, at the periphery of our lives. Rela-
tively few whites go to prison or jail. . . For black and latino people, however, the prison is
more than a metaphor and it is a pervasive element of life in the ghetto." Id at 7.
153 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 17, at 67. The annual per inmate expenditures range
from $2,241 in Texas to $15,946 in New Hampshire. Assuming a fairly strong correlation
between the level of expenditures and prison quality this wide range suggests that state penal
practices are too varied to constitute a constitutional norm.
154 See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 367:
That popular impression of the Penitentiary [as adequate] was not accurate in former
years, and to the extent that it is still present it is not accurate today. . . . However, the
myth tends to be preserved by glowing reports of members of conducted tours of the
[prison] farms who are shown in daylight hours what their conductors want them to see,
who talk to selected convicts, and who are fed a good meal accompanied by the assur-
ance that they are eating 'just what the inmates eat."
155 See note 121 supra. See general 2 AMERICAN PRISONS, sufira note 17, at 5. The federal
prison population dropped from a high of 30,400 in July 1977 to 24,200 in March 1981. The
principal reason for the decline was a shift in Justice Department prosecution emphasis to-
ward white collar, organized crime, public corruption, and major narcotics violations. Con-
tinued high numbers of inmates transferred to community treatment centers immediately
prior to release was also a factor in the decline. See 1982 Appropriations Hearing before the Sub-
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cuits 156 under court order, state penal practices seem an unacceptable
constitutional guide.
In sum, Rhodes exemplifies the Court's unwillingness to employ a
distinct eighth amendment inquiry on the basis of public values like de-
cency and dignity. Its narrow eighth amendment approach de-empha-
sized the importance of the dependency relationship between inmates
and prison officials, ignored the political factors which block prison re-
forms, and rejected "objective indicia"' 5 7 which establish that double
celling is harmful. The importance of the decision is that it established
a mode of eighth amendment analysis that is intrinsically much less
sympathetic to the claims of inmates than that which has heretofore
been employed by the lower federal courts.
C. LESS CRITICAL SCRUTINY OF STATE PENAL PRACTICES
While Rhodes marks the first time that the Court has applied the
eighth amendment to prison conditions, 58 it has recently considered
several constitutional challenges to specific prison practices.159 These
cases have been important in establishing the degree of deference which
the federal courts are to accord state operation of prisons. In a 1974
case, Procunier v. Martinez,160 the Court held that mail censorship regula-
tions in California prisons violated the first amendment and that a ban
on law student and paralegal interviewers infringed upon the inmates'
due process right of access to the courts. In an often quoted section of
the opinion, the Court discussed the limits on the oversight role of the
courts in prison administration:
Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in America are complex and
intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptable of
resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and
the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the prov-
ince of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all these
reasons, courts are ill-equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent
comm. on the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, theJudicia,7 and Related Agencies of/he House
Comm. on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1290-91 (1981) (statement of Norman A. Carl-
son, Director, Bureau of Prisons).
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall stressed that SOCF double celling did not
result from a considered judgment by either the legislature or prison officials but was insti-
tuted simply because more people were being sent to the facility than it was designed to hold.
For a more detailed analysis of the absence of a policy rationale for prison overcrowding, see
Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1191-92 n.16 (D. Conn. 1980).
156 See note l6supra.
157 The phrase is from Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173.
158 101 S. Ct. at 2397-98.
159 Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119; Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817 (1977); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539;
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
160 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of
these facts reflect no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover,
when state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further
reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.16 1
However, in another case that term, Pell v. Procunier,16 2 the Court noted
that deference to the states did not preclude independent judicial scru-
tiny of state penal practices according to "legitimate policies and goals
of the corrections system."1 63 It identified these goals as deterrence, re-
habilitation, and internal security,' 64 and stated that "it is in light of
these legitimate penal objectives that a court must assess challenges to
prison regulations."' 165 The standard for whether penal practices were
unconstitutional was "substantial evidence" that prison officials had "exag-
gerated their response" while undertaking a legitimate penal
function. 166
In later prison cases, the Court did not reject an examination of the
penological justification for state prison practices but did raise the stan-
dard of proof which plaintiffs needed to meet in order to show unconsti-
tutionality. For example, in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners Union, 167 the
Court upheld restrictions on a prisoners labor union on the ground that
prison administrators had not been "conclusively shown to be wrong" in
their view that the union would be disruptive.t 68
As recognized by the Rhodes parties in their briefs, 169 Bell v. Wolf-
ish 170 was the most important of the Court's prison practices cases prior
to Rhodes. In Wolfish, the Court considered constitutional challenges to
a number of practices, including double celling, at the Metropolitan
Correction Center (MCC) in New York, a federal short-term custodial
facility designed primarily to house pre-trial detainees.' 71 This facility
was "intended to include the most advanced and innovative features of
modern design of detention facilities. . .[having] no barred cells, dark
colorless corridors, or clanging steel gates."' 72 In an opinion written by
161 Id at 404-05.
162 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
163 Id at 822.
164 IM at 822-23.
165 Id at 823.
166 Id at 827 (emphasis added).
167 433 U.S. 119.
168 Id at 132 (emphasis added).
169 Brief for Petitioner at 20. Brief for Respondent at 33-38, 101 S. Ct. 2392.
170 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
171 Id at 523. The inmates also unsuccessfully challenged rules prohibiting them from
receiving hardcover books which had not been mailed directly from the publisher, from re-
ceiving packages of food and personal items from outside the facility, and requiring visual
body cavity searches following contact with persons from outside the institution and inmates
to remain outside their cells during routine inspections by security officers. See note 182 infra.
172 Id at 525. Each of the double bunked cells had a total floor space of about seventy-five
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Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that double ceiling at MCC
was not unconstitutional. 173 It rejected the "compelling necessity" test
used by the court of appeals to protect pre-trial detainees from all but
the most necessary restrictions and privitations of confinement.
74
Rather, the Court established that pre-trial detainees were only pro-
tected from punishments intentionally inflicted by prison authorities or
from practices which were arbitrary or purposeless and unrelated to any
legitimate institutional objective.' 75 Citing the size of MCC cells, the
amount of time inmates could spend outside of their cells and the short
confinement period for most inmates, the Court held that double ceiling
did not violate constitutional norms.'
76
The different responses to the double celling question by the lower
courts and the Supreme Court in Wo4/fih, mirror the two major ap-
proaches to eighth amendment analysis.' 77 The district court found
that double celling was a "fundamental deni[al] of decency, privacy,
personal security and simply, civilized humanity."' 78 It pointed to other
cases which found double celling unconstitutional as evidence that the
legal standards of minimum decency had evolved to a point where
double ceiling, even in a first-class, facility like MCC, was
unconstitutional. '
79
Similarly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by
Chief Judge Kaufman, described the lack of privacy in double cells as a
"compelling consideration" and added that "the government had sim-
ply failed to show any substantial justification for double celling."' 80
Noting that the government had easily eliminated MCC double ceiling
in response to the district court's order, the court of appeals held that
there was no penological justification for double ceiling pre-trial
square feet and contained the same furnishings as the SOCF cells. Id at 541. MCC inmates
were confined to their cells for seven-and-a-half hours and for two brief headcounts daily.
Otherwise, they were free to move between their cells and common areas, comparable to the
SOCF dayrooms. Id Five percent of all MCC inmates spent less than thirty days at the
facility and seventy-three percent less than sixty days. Id at 524-25 n.3. Soon after it opened,
MCC's population exceeded its capacity and double celling was instituted. Id at 525-26.
The district court ordered an end to the double celling of all prisoners. U.S. ex rtel. Wolfish v.
Levi, 428 F. Supp. 333, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The court of appeals limited this order to
pre-trial detainees, holding that double ceiling was not cruel and unusual punishment under
the circumstances. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1978).
173 441 U.S. at 525.
174 Id at 531-33.
175 Id at 537-38.
176 Id at 541-43.
177 See note 100 & accompanying text supra.
178 428 F. Supp. at 339.
179 Id
t80 573 F.2d at 127.
[Vol. 721368
STA TE PRISON CONDITIONS
detainees. 18'
In contrast, the Supreme Court neither considered double ceiling's
effect on any dignity or privacy interests of MCC inmates, nor rigor-
ously scrutinized the rationale for the other MCC practices which the
inmates had challenged.'8 2 It rejected the notion that "there is some
sort of'one man, one cell' principle lurking in the due process clause."'
8 3
The Court also warned against federal court activism in prison affairs.
While noting that federal courts had rightly condemned "sordid" condi-
tions at some prisons, it added that:
Many of these same courts have, in the name of the constitution, become
increasingly enmeshed in the minutiae of prison administration. Judges
• ..have a natural tendency to believe that their individual solution to
often intractable problems are better and more workable than those of the
persons who are actually charged with and trained in the running of a
particular institution. . . .The inquiry of federal courts into prison man-
agement must be limited to the issue of whether a particular system vio-
lates any prohibition of the Coilstitution. 184
Woih- impact on subsequent eight amendment prison cases was
not dramatic. 8 5 While some courts interpreted the decision as substan-
tially limiting judicial involvement in improving prison conditions,
8 6
others distinguished Wo4i&h on its facts, noting that MCC was modern,
its inmates short-term and its essential services as yet undisrupted by
overcrowding'
8 7
While the Court in Rhodes did not rely on Wo4ftsh, Rhodes neverthe-
181 Id MCC's population was reduced by transferring most of convicted inmates to other
institutions. The Supreme Court dismisses this finding as irrelevant. 441 U.S. at 541 n.25.
182 441 U.S. at 542. The "toothless" scrutiny which the majority employed in upholding
all the other challenged practices on security grounds is revealed in Justice Marshall's dissent.
He points out that the publishers only rule is unduly restrictive since the number of books
allowed per inmate might be limited or MCC could use its electronic and flourscopic detec-
tors to search for contraband. Id. at 572-74. Other institutions had adopted much less restric-
tive regulations than MCC's concerning receipt of packages by inmates. Id at 574-76. The
inmates had a significant interest in the search of their cells because unobserved searches
might invite abuse or theft of inmate property by guards and provide an opportunity for
contraband to be planted. Id at 576. As to the body cavity searches, Justice Marshall noted
that MCC inmates wore one piece jumpsuits which would have to be partially removed
before an inmate could insert contraband into a body cavity. Also, contact visits occurred in
a glass enclosed room which was continuously monitored and visitors and their packages were
searched before entering the visiting area. Id at 576-79.
183 Id
184 Id at 562.
185 For a general assessment of Wolfuh and its impact, see Robbins, The CV' of Wof ah in the
Federal Courts: The Future of FederalJudidal Intervention in Pnron Administration, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
C. 211 (1980).
186 See, e.g., Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981).
187 See, e.g. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559; Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1181-89;
Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1287. The Supreme Court noted this factual disparity
with eighth amendment prison cases in the Wo(!h opinion. 441 U.S. at 543 n.7.
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less eliminated any question that the limited role of the courts in prison
administration as outlined in Wo6sh is equally applicable in the eighth
amendment context. The decisions are complementary in their defer-
ence to state penal practices and their unwillingness to incorporate dig-
nity, privacy or decency concerns in their analysis of prison conditions.
Read together, the two cases leave little doubt that the Court is pressing
for substantially less rigorous federal court scrutiny of state prison
conditions.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PRISON CONDITIONS LITIGATION:
THE STATUS OF THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
Prior to Rhodes, the federal courts used several different "tests" to
evaluate prison conditions in eighth amendment cases.""' The two most
important standards were the "totality of the circumstances" test and
the "minimum necessities" test. As the parties in Rhodes recognized in
their briefs, 18 9 the Court's treatment of these two tests would be a key
feature of its decision.
When an inmate makes an eighth amendment challenge to a spe-
cific prison practice, a court focuses solely on that particular practice.
For example, in Estelle v. Gamble,' 90 the Supreme Court considered only
if penal authorities had deliberately denied medical care to the plain-
tiff.' 9 1 In contrast, in prison conditions cases like Rhodes, inmates chal-
lenge a panoply of conditions and practices. 192 When examined
individually, each of these factors may not amount to a constitutional
violation. A totality of the circumstances test, however, permits a court
to analyze the institutional environment as a whole and to conclude that
the cumulative impact of prison conditions on inmates constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment.
9 3
The use of the totality of the circumstances test by lower federal
courts is closely tied to their willingness to use the eighth amendment to
protect "evolving standards of decency" and to scrutinize critically the
188 See Fair, The Lower Federal Courts as Constitution-Makers: The Case of Prison Conditions, 7
AM. J. CRIM. L. 119 (1979).
189 Brief for Petitioner at 18; Brief for Respondent at 23-29.
190 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
191 Id at 104-05.
192 See generally Note, Complex Enforcement.- Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 626 (1981).
193 See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1309 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Each factor separately
may not rise to constitutional dimensions. However, the effects of the totality of these circum-
stances is the infliction of punishment on inmates in violation of the eighth amendment.").
See Justice Brennan's concurring opinion for a discussion of the most common elements in a
totality of the circumstances test. 101 S. Ct. at 2408.
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penological justification for prison conditions. For example, in Pugh v.
Locke,' 94 the district court emphasized the standards of decency compo-
nent of the eighth amendment and linked it to judicial examination of
the relation between the conditions in Alabama prisons and the legiti-
mate penological objectives of deterrence, security and rehabilitation. 9-1
One important corollary of the totality of the circumstances test is that
once prison conditions are found to violate the constitution, the reme-
dial power of the court extends to all aspects of prison administration.
Federal courts utilizing the totality of conditions approach have consist-
ently ordered comprehensive institutional remedies which have included
wide-ranging and detailed improvements in prison facilities, staff and
operation. 1
9 6
In contrast, the minimum necessities test embodies a much more
limited understanding of the eighth amendment and of the oversight
role of the courts:
If the State furnishes its prisoners with reasonably adequate food, clothing,
shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, so as to avoid the
imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, that ends its obligation under
Amendment Eight. The Constitution does not mandate that prisoners, as
individuals or as a group, be provided with any and every amenity which
some person may think is needed to avoid mental, physical and emotional
deterioration. 97
The practical consequences of the difference between the two tests
is illustrated by comparing the district court's treatment of prison condi-
tions in Rhodes with the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Crowe v. Leek.' 98 In
Crowe, three inmates were confined to a sixty-five square foot cell.' 99
The circuit court found no eighth amendment violation because the
prisoners were not physically or mentally abused and were not deprived
of the implements of personal hygiene, medical care, exercise or basic
sanitation. 200 The district court in Rhodes also found that the essential
needs of the inmates were being met. However, by employing a totality
of the circumstances test it found five factors which together made
double ceiling unconstitutional. 2
°1
Rhodes did not explicitly adopt either the totality of circumstances
or the minimum necessities test.20 2 Justice Brennan, in his concurring
194 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
195 Id at 328-29.
196 See genera4ly Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265; note 36 supra.
197 Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1977).
198 540 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
199 Id at 741.
200 Id at 742.
201 434 F. Supp. at 1020-21.
202 Prior to Rhodes the Court did approve part of a comprehensive order covering the Ar-
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opinion, argued that the Court was employing a totality of the circum-
stances test.20 3 Yet, the majority seems to have attempted to combine
the two tests: "Conditions alone and in combination may deprive inmates of
the minimal civilzied measure of 4fe-s necessities."'20 4 The thrust of the opin-
ion, however, is that double celling neither deprived inmates of essential
food, medical care or sanitation, nor caused a disproportionate increase
in prison violence or any other specific intolerable conditions.2 0 5 The
Court also narrowed the focus of its analysis to the actual present impact
of prison conditions on inmates, foreclosing a broader, anticipatory ex-
amination of their effects.
206
Thus, Rhodes does not prevent courts from weighing the cumula-
tive impact of certain prison conditions. In this sense it retains the
framework of the totality of the circumstances test. However, by limit-
ing the factors to be used in the eighth amendment analysis to depriva-
tions of basic necessities and to serious present harm, Rhodes eviscerates
the expansive totality of the circumstances test heretofore employed by
the lower courts. This impact is illustrated by Ruiz v. Estelle,20 7 a post-
Rhodes case, where the Fifth Circuit explicitly adopted a totality of the
circumstances test 208 yet stayed the imposition of major components of a
comprehensive prison remedy which the district court had ordered after
making extensive findings of facts and utilizing a much broader totality
of circumstances analysis.
20 9
kansas prison system, stating that "the order is supported by the interdependence of the con-
ditions producing the violation." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 675, 688 (1978).
203 101 S. Ct. at 2407 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring). In his opinion, Justice Brennan
rather disingenuously relies on Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977) when
developing his version of the totality of the circumstances test. In Laaman, the prisoners were
"adequately warehoused." Id at 306. The prison was not overcrowded and each prisoner
had his own cell. Food, sanitation, exercise, medical services and the conduct of the correc-
tional officers were not abusive. Id Nevertheless, the district court ordered major improve-
ments in the facility, its programs and staff on the basis of an emerging right that inmates
must be imprisoned in an environment which: (1) does not threaten their well-being or san-
ity; (2) is not counterproductive to the inmates' efforts to rehabilitate themselves; and (3) does
not increase the probability of the inmates' future incarceration. Id. at 316.
In contrast, Justice Brennan limits the totality of the circumstances test to the actual
present harm which double celling causes, and, unlike the Laaman court, does not consider its
long-term effects. In this sense, Justice Brennan's analysis differs little from the majority's.
His understanding of the eighth amendment as embodying a distinct "decency" standard,
101 S. Ct. at 2406, would have permitted a much more ambitious application of the totality
of the circumstances test.
204 Id at 2399 (emphasis added).
205 Id
206 See note 4 supra.
207 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981).
208 Id at 568. The court relies heavily on Rhodes.
209 Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1383-84.
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VII. CONCLUSION
With Rhodes the Supreme Court avoided a multi-billion dollar con-
troversy with the states and establishing a strong precedent for judicial
scrutiny and reshaping of inadequate state institutions. The Court only.
employed the two traditional applications of the eighth amendment and
failed to consider if long-term double celling offends "evolving standards
of decency." Its analysis overlooks both expert opinion that double cel-
ling is harmful and the political factors which make it impossible for
many states to maintain humane prisons. Rhodes effectively eviscerates
the totality of the circumstances test by limiting the eighth amendment
inquiry to whether prison conditions currently deny inmates a "minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities." Rhodes probably marks the begin-
ning of the end of the judiciary's current role as a "critical force" in
ameliorating conditions at state prisons. In some states, it is likely to
lead to worsening prison conditions until they reach such a "sordid"
level that will even "shock the conscience" of the Burger Court.
THOMAS J. BAMONTE
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